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Activities of the land commission were brought to a halt this year in March 
2015, after communities living in the southern province of Makamba bor-
dering Tanzania in Burundi, barricaded roads using stones and tree trunks 
to prevent the land commission’s agents from implementing their deci-
sions in favour of claimants. For over two weeks, both residents abasangwa, 
and repatriates abahungutse, stood together to oppose the land commission: 
the Commission Nationale Terres et autres Biens (CNTB, National Commis-
sion of Land and other Assets), a body revisiting land restitution cases it 
had previously settled. The land commission had previously favoured the 
sharing of property between returnees and the residents. Abasangwa and 
abahungutse in Makamba together now accused the commission of corrup-
tion, with former claimants now owning several properties as a result of 
bribing the land commission’s officials. Residents of Nyanza-lac, Kibago, 
Vugizo and Mabanda communes in the Makamba province, viewed the 
recent move by the land commission as a form of ‘spoliation’, in their eyes 
the commission had enabled corrupt practices with people acquiring sev-
eral plots of land through the bribing of CNTB officials, overturning resolved 
land restitution cases.1 In March 2015, the president’s office supported the 
governor’s decision to suspend temporarily activities of the CNTB till after 
the 2015 elections.
Land stands today are a testimony to the past, to the mass violence ex-
perienced by Barundi, and malleable law. A rebellion coming from south-
ern Burundi, in 1972 launched a massacre against the Batutsi, led to gen-
ocide2 of Hutu elites and peasantry by the republican state, led by a Tutsi 
1 Complaints have been made against the land commission of people passing themselves 
for repatriates in order to acquire properties and sell them off, land restitution had become 
a “business.” Dieudonné Hakizimana and Christian Bigirimana, “Makamba: des conflits 
fonciers ravivent les tensions,” Iwacu, April 20, 2014, http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/
makamba-des-conflits-fonciers-ravivent-les-tensions.
2 Jean-Pierre Chrétien and Jean-Francois Dupaquier, Burundi 1972: Au bord des génocides. (Paris: 
Editions Karthala, 2007). Chrétien and Dupaquier refer to the “bureaucratic aspect” of the 
organization of killings of Hutu describe events of 1972 as genocide (pp. 477).
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military dictatorship. After the violence, which killed over 150,000, exiling 
thousands of Hutu, the state distributed the land to new landowners (most-
ly Tutsi), state and private companies. Over 150,000 Hutu were killed and 
over 300,000 fled to neighbouring countries in 1972. Since 1965, waves of 
killings and retaliatory killing continued to break out in 1988, 1991 culmi-
nating into the 1993 civil war which broke out and lasted over a decade 
following a coup against the first democratically elected Hutu president 
Melchior Ndadaye. In a space where 1972 is not publicly commemorated 
except for small gatherings, references in the media, discussing, ikiza3, the 
scourge, evokes a lot of emotions from all ethnic groups and is painfully 
discussed, as one group, the Tutsi, trying to exterminate the other, the Hutu 
and vice versa, while the Batwa are excluded from the debate.
Tensions are high following the 2011 approach of the CNTB, whose 
motto is Gira aho uba wubahwe,4 to restore property currently owned by aba-
sangwa, to abahungutse, thus ending previous land sharing agreements as 
a solution to land scarcity and reconciling communities. Those with title 
deeds, argue that they bought the land in good faith, and have thus con-
tested the legality of these claims. This paper studied the ways in which 
land tenure has changed through different periods of the past. Consecutive 
political violence since Burundi’s independence has produced a displaced 
population: refugees, orphans, and internally displaced persons amongst 
others. The land restitution process has been used as a way to assert indi-
geneity and serve as a form of compensation for past injustices and retribu-
tion for those who moved into the properties of the refugees. This process 
has recreated new victims and new perpetrators.
As land remains a material reminder in the present about the con-
tested memories and experiences of the past, land disputes play into the 
politics of autochthony about who belongs and does not belong, who is a 
citizen and who can be heard by the state. Land restitution offers not only a 
way of acknowledging the past, of healing, but also of rendering some form 
of justice to one part of the population, and reaffirming their citizenship.5
Lemarchand (1996) called it a ‘selected genocide’ due to its particular focus on the elite and the 
educated Hutu, though peasants were also killed. Hutu government and army leaders were 
assassinated.
3 Chrétien and Dupaquier, Burundi 1972, 9.
4 “Have a home, be respected” in Kirundi
5 Ruth Hall “Reconciling the Past, Present, and Future: The Parameters and Practices of Land 
Restitution in South Africa” in eds. Cherryl Walker, Anna Bohlin, Ruth Hall and Thembela 
Kepe, Land, memory, reconstruction, and justice: perspectives on land claims in South Africa (Ohio: 
Ohio University Press, 2010); Derick Fay and Deborah James, “Giving land back or righting 
wrongs? Comparative issues in the study of land restitution” in Cherryl Walker, Anna Bohlin, 
Ruth Hall and Thembela Kepe (eds.) Land, memory, reconstruction, and justice: perspectives on 
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This research asks the following question: By factoring in the ways 
in which land disputes are presented, negotiated and resolved by the 
CNTB, this research assesses the connections between the past and present 
through land: How political violence transforms the land question? What 
does the state’s approach reveal about the connection between land and 
citizenship? How did the political settlement affect the land commission? 
How is land used to remember the past, and assert indigeneity? Though 
the focus on this paper is on land disputes related to land restitution, it has 
to be acknowledged that most land disputes are intrafamily: disagreements 
over land are disputes over rights to customary land between family mem-
bers and neighbours.6 Over 90% of the population living off the land, and 
with over 90% of cases of land disputes, going to courts and tribunals.
The paper is divided in three sections: the first section traces the his-
tory and connection between land tenure, indigeneity, ethnicity, violence 
and the law. This will show how land and people are central in the gene-
alogy of power relations. The second section looks at the policy on land 
restitution on paper, while the third section frames the debate on land 
restitution policy in praxis. The former constitutes everyone as a survivor, 
while the second recognizes one set as victims and the other as perpetra-
tors. Political reform in Burundi has sought to resolve the land question, 
using the law, a product of the political violence, as a way to render justice 
to victims of the past. This paper shows how land ownership becomes cen-
tral to belonging in the nation-state and how indigeneity and ethnicity are 
reasserted through land after violence.
From body to territory: 
Sovereignty from the precolonial to the postcolonial
 This historical background section traces the history of the relationship 
between land, ethnicity and political violence. To grasp how the ruling par-
ty through the state, have chosen to handle the question of former refu-
gees and their properties, by asking the beneficiaries of the past who now 
have legal rights over the properties to vacate them for their ‘original’ own-
ers, one has to understand the history of land relations, political violence 
and ethnicity. Land has come to symbolize citizenship, and state control, 
whereas in the precolonial land represented not only what one could com-
land claims in South Africa (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2010); Pauline E. Peters, “Inequality 
and Social Conflict over Land in Africa.” Journal of Agrarian Change, 4 (2004, 3).
6 Dominik Kohlhagen, “In quest of legitimacy: Changes in land law and legal reform in 
Burundi”, Rethinking Development in an Age of Scarcity and Uncertainty: New Values, Voices and 
Alliances for Increased Resilience (University of York 2011)
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munally enjoy, but also services and tribute to be paid to leaders. Each 
period shows how relations around power, land and identity continue to 
change: sovereignty shifts from body to territory, with the territory empow-
ering the state over people7.
In 19th century Burundi, the mwami, king, had pre-eminent right over 
the land, but this right over property was more in theory than in praxis8. 
This is because the king ruled over the domains he owned, while the rest 
of his territory was delegated to royal princes, and chiefs to rule over. Land 
belonged collectively to families, and members only had usufruct rights 
without it being a private property9. Jan Vansina10 describes the location of 
power in the “alliance of lineages” and kings were meant to have emerged 
from those who first came and cleared the land, others would join the 
lineage as clients. Thus land tenure writes Vansina was important for the 
foundation of political structure. This makes Rwanda and Burundi unique, 
argues Vansina, for its political structures, which dictated land usage.
In the late nineteenth century, the strengthening of political control 
over land clashed with the population’s demographic expansion, with “the 
clearing of vast lands and vested rights by the one who cleared the land”11. 
With a higher number of chiefs and sub-chiefs with their own increased 
demands, those in power sought to halt the ‘vested rights of ancestry’, and 
end lineage-based form of organization, in order to reduce the size of en-
closures made up of extended families, to smaller ones for greater gains 
by each urugo, home.12 Land management in the nineteenth century was 
decentralized, and for land use in lineages was based on indigeneity, those 
who first cleared the land.
Ethnicity was unknown and ubwoko was used to categorize people, 
trees, and plants. The same language and religion are shared among the 
four categories of people: Ganwa (royalty), Hutu, Tutsi and Twa.13 One 
could have a double identity of Hutu and Tutsi; it was not an “immutable” 
7 Kings of Burundi were buried facing north of Burundi to mark the border with Rwanda, 
Jean-Pierre Chrétien and Émile Mworoha, “Les tombeaux des bami du Burundi: Un aspect 
de la monarchie sacrée en Afrique orientale,” Cahier d’Études Africaines, 10, 37 (1970)
8 Roger Botte (1982), “Burundi: de quoi vivait l’État (Burundi: How the State Made a Living) in 
Cahiers d’Études Africaines, Vol. 22, Cahier 87/88, Systèmes étatique africains (1982), pp. 277-324; 
Joseph Gahama, Le Burundi sous administration Belge. (Paris: Karthala, 1983).
9 Gahama, Burundi sous administration Belge, 310.
10 Jan Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya kingdom (Wisconsin: The University 
of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 29.
11 Botte, Burundi: How the State Made a Living, 313.
12 Ibid.
13 Jean-Pierre Chrétien, Burundi L’ histoire retrouvée: 25ans de métier d’ historien en Afrique (Paris: 
Editions Karthala, 1993).
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identity. Hutu had two definitions: first a cultural or ethnic defined identity 
and one defined by social connotations.14 Status, and not ethnic identity 
“was the principal determinant of rank and privilege” in precolonial Bu-
rundi.15 After the Baganwa, the princes, the Banyamabanga, coming from 
mostly Hutu lineages, were the most influential as a ‘hereditary politico-rit-
ualist aristocracy’.16 This category exercised spiritual power at the court of 
leaders and amongst the peasantry. They were holders of the secrets of the 
state, organized royal ceremonies and cults. The role Banyamabanga ‘the 
men of secrets’, who came mostly from Hutu lineages, was brought to an 
end during the colonial period. Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa were not part of 
an order of dependency, but rather formed ranks within the same masses 
of banyagihugu (population) as producers of goods and suppliers of servic-
es to the kingdom.17
Belgian colonial administration18 expropriated peasants from their 
land for the profit of mining and agricultural companies or religious in-
stitutions, and reduced the domains owned by the king. Expulsions or 
dispossessions were not as common in the precolonial than in the colo-
nial period, as it was in the chief ’s interest to have control over the largest 
number of subjects.19 Reforms of the 1939 land law increased the power of 
customary authorities to intervene in land tenure. It gave power to chiefs 
to distribute vacant land, still in its wilderness, and receive payment for it.20 
From now onwards, peasants required the authorization of subchief and 
chief in order to clear marshland, bringing the authorities to intervene in 
land disputes, thus reducing the power belonging to the Bashingantahe in 
the lineage who used to resolve disputes.21 This produced rivalry as chiefs 
would receive the payment from new landowners, and act as the new own-
ers of the land. Therefore colonial rule intensified the power of chiefs and 
Baganwa over land tenure and changed the relationship between chiefs 
and subjects, which was new to this region.
14 René Lemarchand, Burundi Ethnic conflict and Genocide (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996) 10, 15.
15 Ibid., 10.
16 Émile Mworoha, Peuples et rois de l’Afrique des Lacs: Le Burundi et les royaumes voisins au XIXe 
siècle (Dakar-Abidjan: Les Nouvelles éditions Africaines, 1977), 116.
17 Ibid.
18 King Mwezi Gisabo (1852-1908) after having resisted the Germans signed the treaty of 
Kiganda, which recognized the kingdom as a German protectorate. The Germans proceeded 
with indirect rule. Belgium ruled Ruanda-Urundi under the League of Nations mandate after 
the First World War led Germany to lose its protectorates.
19 Gahama, Burundi sous administration Belge.
20 Ibid., 313.
21 Ibid.
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Belgian colonisers were surprised to find that the rule of chiefs, 
princes was not territorially based, but tied to ‘personal relationships’.22 
Even when princes went to war it was not over territory but over the gain-
ing of ‘productive producers’: igihugu ntikiribwa ivu kiribwa abantu, a country 
does not feed on land, but on people.23 The colonial administrators then 
set out to correct it to its own ideal of customs by “restoring the custom in 
its primitive purity: the political connection became once again territori-
al”24. Chiefs were from now on bound to defined territories and not people. 
The colonial administration creates a feudal hierarchical power, yet the 
kingdom allowed for independent minded chefs, personal connections that 
allowed the population to taunt their chiefs, as well as the confusing of ter-
ritorial borders due to numerous enclaves.25
The colonial historiography described a “feudal” kingdom with Hutu 
as the majority, autochthonous and serfs, Tutsi as the minority, a racial iden-
tity, a superior race as the Hamite coloniser from Ethiopia, natural ruler 
with the royal Baganwa were assimilated into the Tutsi.26 The last group, the 
Batwa, the pygmies were described as the first inhabitants.27 Missionaries, 
explorers and colonial administrators emphasized on the physiognomy of 
the Barundi, which Lisa Malkki describes as “heavily elaborated cultural 
constructs – ideal types confounded by the reality of physical diversity and 
variation – did not in the least detract from their power as classificatory 
tools”.28 For Chrétien the “social manipulation” of colonisers, who were 
informed by the missionaries, was based on three axes: feudalism, racial 
policy and cultural segregation29.
The regrouping of chiefs and sub-chiefs practiced in Rwanda and Bu-
rundi by the resident Belgian governor in both countries in 1930s led to a 
22 Jean-Pierre Chrétien, “Une révolte au Burundi en 1934: Les racines traditionalistes de 
l’hostilité à la colonisation” in Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales, 25e Année, No. 6 (Nov. – Dec., 
1970), 1702.
23 Botte, Burundi: How the State Made a Living, 278.
24 Government report 1927 in Chrétien, “Une révolte au Burundi en 1934”, 1702.
25 Chrétien, “Une révolte au Burundi en 1934.”
26 Ruanda-Urundi: In Ruanda, the royalty designated themselves as Tutsi unlike Burundi where 
they were above Hutu and Tutsi identities as ‘Baganwa’
27 Jan Vansina and other scholars such as David L. Schoenbrun have rejected the migration 
hypothesis of the Great Lakes region. “There were never successive immigrations of Twa 
foragers, Hutu farmers, and Tutsi herders since these social categories were only slowly 
developed as a means of labeling persons who were in the country” writes Vansina”, Vansina, 
Nyiginya, 198.
28 Liisa H. Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees 
in Tanzania (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1994), 79.
29 Jean-Pierre Chrétien, “Hutu et Tutsi au Rwanda et au Burundi” in Au cœur de l’ethnie, ed. Jean-
Loup Amselle Elikia M’Bokolo 2nd Ed. (Paris: Editions La Découverte, 1999) 143.
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massive elimination of Bahutu leaders in place during that period. Tutsi 
power was naturalized countrywide. Segregation took place in schools, the 
Tutsi were the future leaders, administrators.30 In 1959, before independ-
ence in 1962, chieftaincy whose numbers had been substantially reduced 
during the colonial period, centralizing power in the hands of few, was 
brought to end.31 Land, which was not registered, became the property of 
the state in 1960, allowing those who were granted plots by chiefs to regis-
ter the land. Yet very few registered their land. In 1961, a title deed could 
be registered; yet, customary rights to land continued to prevail in regards 
to land relations. Though in statutory law, rule by ‘custom’ is not explained 
in any legal text.32
Despite colonial administration segregation, Hutu and Tutsi were not 
territorially segregated, each with their own Native Authority, as would be 
the case with indirect rule; instead, they lived in the same space inside 
racially segregated institutions. This was thus a two-tiered racialized sys-
tem, the first tier distinguishing whites from natives, the second Tutsi from 
Hutu. This was more of a centralized than a decentralized despotism. In-
stead of a decentralized despotism, with tribalized identities of Hutu and 
Tutsi having different ethnic homelands with their own native authorities 
and customary laws, it was rather a racialized centralized despotism with-
in a single political and legal space.33 This affected the formation of the 
post-colonial state. Politics of land is based on indigeneity in the precoloni-
al, shifting to ethnicity during the colonial period: Hutu is constructed as 
autochthon while Tutsi is a migrant. Post-independence politics must be 
understood as continuing the colonial legacy whose structures and ideolo-
gies were not reformed.
Upon independence in 1962, it was a nationalist movement UPRONA 
(Union for National Progress) that came to power, led by Prince Louis Rwa-
gasore who was soon murdered after the win in 1961. The party had both 
Hutu and Tutsi leaders, yet it is fight for Hutu representation in leadership 
which resulted in the tumultuous year of 1965 when the Hutu prime min-
ister Pierre Ngendandumwe is murdered, and following legislative win by 
30 Between 1929 and 1954, the rate of Bahutu chiefs went from 10% to 0% that of Batutsi chiefs 
from 21 to 26% with the blood princes taking the lion share in Chrétien, “Hutu et Tutsi au 
Rwanda et au Burundi,” 145.
31 Botte, Burundi: How the State Made a Living; Kohlhagen, “In quest of legitimacy.”
32 Kohlhagen, “In quest of legitimacy,” 8.
33 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide 
in Rwanda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and 
Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1996).
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the Hutu of over two thirds, King Mwambutsa Bangiricenge constitutes a 
new government led by the Ganwa royalty.34 This was an important turn-
ing point in the hardening of ethnic rule and rivalries, which reinforced 
the colonial racialized centralized despotism, with the Baganwa and Tutsi 
seeking to hold power in government while the Hutu sought representa-
tion that equalled their numbers. When violence breaks out in political 
contestation amongst elites, it was thereafter used by the same elites to 
mobilize the population: “the initiatives of ethnic violence were led by the 
ruling stratum. After have confronted each other, the Hutu and Tutsi elites 
exported ethnic violence to the masses”.35 Violence from the elites was dis-
persed into the population. Violence not only has political but economic 
underpinnings, as political power, is connected to economic access. After 
1972, a strengthened racialized centralized despotism held power, without 
Hutu political representation. The armed struggle was the outcome, with 
the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu) created in 
1980 in a refugee camp in Tanzania.36
The rebellion in 1972 that set off the violence was led by Congolese 
Mulelist led massacres against Tutsi aimed at their extermination and their 
entire families, as well as Hutu who fit the so-called Tutsi prototype.37 The 
rebels calling themselves “Mulele” came either from Zaïre or Tanzania, 
others were Babembe or Babwari already living in Swahili districts on the 
Burundi littoral, however most of the insurgents were Hutu who lived in 
the southern provinces, viewing the Tutsi as the enemy.38 A witness de-
scribed the attack in Nyanza-Lac commune, as being led by the people 
called Mulele from the Imbo region; they viewed themselves as Hutu liber-
ators and sought to exterminate the Tutsi. A Hutu from the mountain was 
referred to as Tutsi and was the enemy.39 Any person with a straight nose 
and tall stature was killed, whether Tutsi or not, they wanted to liberate 
the Hutu, “because in Imbo people could not stand the presence amongst 
themselves of those who came from the interior of the country”.40 The vi-
olence in 1965 and 1972, the attack against Tutsi by Hutus, followed a blind 
repression led against educated Hutu, was ethnic violence amongst per-
34 René Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970) 296.
35 Barnabé Ndarishikanye, “Burundi: des identities ethnico-politique forgées dans la violence,” 
Canadian Journal of African Studies (Vol. 33, No. 2/3, 1999) 287.
36 Malkki, Purity and Exile.
37 Ndarishikanye, “Burundi: des identities ethnico-politique”; Chrétien and Dupaquier, Burundi 
1972.
38 Chrétien and Dupaquier, Burundi 1972, 97.
39 Ibid., 102.
40 Ibid., 102.
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sons in similar social conditions, without them being the instigators.41 This 
ignited the beginning of cycle of mass violence, perpetrated by one ethnic 
group against the other, the state vs. the people. Ethnic consciousness-rais-
ing occurred through violence.42 Events in Rwanda, also affect politics in 
Burundi, leading to a tense first decade after independence due to ethnic 
rivalries and growing regionalism. The so-called social revolution of 1959 in 
Rwanda reinforced politicized colonial identities. A small educated bour-
geoisie that started anti-Tutsi movement, which was not instant among 
the peasantry43. This movement results in thousands of Tutsi killed, Over 
150,000 Tutsi refugees left for Burundi and Uganda to seek refuge against 
the massacres of Tutsi in 1959 to 1963 in Rwanda. This has influenced the 
“construction of a Tutsi dominated political system in Bujumbura.”44
In order to understand the history of those who came from the coun-
tryside vs. those living on the Tanganyika coast, one must understand the 
history of the region. The Imbo region where the Mulele attack took place, 
stretches from Lake Tanganyika shore to dry lowland area, it has a different 
economy and social relations, than the highland and grassland. The region 
engaged in commercial ties with the Lake Tanganyika with Muslim trade 
networks different from culture of dynastic Burundi.45 In the 20th century, 
the Hutu chiefs in the region were subjected to Baganwa, the princes. King 
Mwezi Gisabo would send Tutsi representatives to the Imbo region; the 
Belgians, who eliminated Hutu chiefs, made this worse. Yet in the 19th 
century, the region was rich in exchanges with services or tribute made to 
the court, with salt, mats. The sleeping sickness decimated the region from 
1905, only in 1930 onwards, the population increased. Imbo inhabitants 
view themselves as Hutu.46 The culture is different, Swahili is widely spo-
ken, in contact with and exchanging with Congolese, fishermen, artisans, 
traders, by independence it was Hutu authorities that were elected under 
UPRONA. Babembe from then Zaïre moved to other shore of the Lake Tan-
ganyika in 1950s and easily integrated themselves. The 1960s Imbo region 
was as a particularly welcoming cosmopolitan place, with Swahili, Indians, 
Babembe, Arabs, Rwandan and Barundi from all regions with 5,000 inhab-
41 Ndarishikanye, “Burundi: des identities ethnico-politique”.
42 Chrétien and Dupaquier, Burundi 1972, 21.
43 Claudine Vidal, “Situations ethniques au Rwanda” in Au cœur de l’ethnie, ed. Jean-Loup 
Amselle Elikia M’Bokolo 2nd Ed. (Paris: Editions La Découverte, 1999).
44 Prunier G. The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of Genocide, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 
1995) 198.
45 David Newbury (2001) Pre-colonial Burundi and Rwanda: Local Loyalties, Regional Royalties” 
The International Journal of African Historical Studies 34 (No. 2, 2001) 262.
46 Chrétien and Dupaquier, Burundi 1972, 103.
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itants.47
The refugees who returned after 1972, got access to their plot, whilst 
neighbours and local administrators took over the plots of land of the thou-
sands who did not return. Population from other provinces and communes 
moved to Rumonge soon afterwards, often they were encouraged by the 
administration, and attracted to the very fertile land, bordering the lake 
Tanganyika.48 From 1974 to 1975, an important number of senior govern-
ment officials took over properties, and would acquire several hectares or 
even an entire zone.49 There are relatives who remained and who sold part 
of property to avoid having to share family land upon return of the refugees 
or exiled family members.50 Not all Hutu fled, but the large majority did51.
In the second republic (1976 to 1987) led by Colonel Jean-Baptiste 
Bagaza who came to power through a coup, the first land commission was 
set up with a mission to settle the property disputes with the returning pop-
ulation. The commission had a special court with jurisdiction of common 
law.52 The state passed a decree to support its work to restore the belongings 
of the repatriates.53 The so-called 1976 Mandi commission was ambiguous 
as it aimed to end illegal land attributions by the Michel Micombero re-
gime54, yet at the same time legalised a great number of these same attri-
butions, with previous owners’ rights limited to partial compensation. Thus 
very few refugees returned.55 Out of 236 lodged complaints, 177 land rights 
were restored their properties.56
By 1977, a decree brought to an end ubugererwa, as part of the Mandi 
commission, which allowed a family to give land to the landless, implied 
47 Kohlhagen, “In quest of legitimacy,” 52-54.
48 Gervais Gatunange, “La problématique foncière dans la perspective du rapatriement et de la 
reinsertion des sinistrés” in Observatoire de l’Action Gouvernementale, Bujumbura, 9.
49 République du Burundi, Commission Nationale Terres et autres Biens: bilan d’activités période 2006 
– 2011, (Lake House, Bujumbura), 29.
50 Gatunange, “La problématique foncière,” 10.
51 Félicien Sinarinzi and Théodora Nisabwe, “Étude sur la problématique des terres laissées 
par les refugiés de 1972 dans les communes Rumonge et Nyanza- Lac”, requested by the 
Presidency of the Fourth Commission of Arusha interBurundi negotiations, in charge of 
Development and Reconstruction, Bujumbura, October 1999.
52 Gatunange, “La problématique foncière,” 10.
53 Law decree n° 1/191 of 30 December 1976 referred to land illegally attributed must return to 
the state, in Sinarinzi and  Nisabwe, “Étude sur la problématique des terres”
54 Captain Michel Micombero led a coup against the monarchy and formed the first republic 
from 1966 till 1977 when he was overthrown by Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza
55 RCN Justice and Democracy Etude sur les pratiques foncières au Burundi: Essai d’ harmonisation; 
Enquêtes menées dans 10 provinces du Burundi en février – mars 2004 (Bujumbura, 2004).
56 Gatunange, “La problématique foncière,” 10.
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an engagement in a patron client relationship.57 Those who occupied that 
land were granted rights to that land after having lived in it for over fifteen 
years, whether the first occupation was illegal in the first place or not. Yet 
dismal number of people registered those plots 50 years since the 1960 
decree.58 The 1986 land code, ‘a compilation of former colonial laws’ distin-
guished between registered land with a land title as ‘propriété’, which would 
be protected by the state law, vs. ‘droits privatifs’ or customary recognized 
rights, which if left vacant for over two years, the state could claim owner-
ship59. From a legal perspective, former occupants were the original own-
ers and new occupants enjoy the land as owners without necessarily being 
the owners. The owner is of bad faith when he enjoys as the owner whilst 
knowing in reality that he is not one. Hence the thirty year prescription 
which transforms an occupant into an owner even if they were an owner 
of bad faith, whereas, if one occupied property in good faith, one acquires 
the title of the property in fifteen years.60 This means that by the year 2005 
whether one occupied land in good faith or in bad faith, one would be an 
owner if they took over properties after 1972.
In the third republic (1987-1988), President Pierre Buyoya’s ascension 
to power after a coup in 1987 coincided with the democratization of the 
1990s. There was pressure from the international community following re-
cent killings and counter killings of Ntega-Marangara in the north, when a 
Hutu group attacked a Tutsi population, and the response was the repres-
sion of the Hutu population by the Tutsi majority army in 1988. President 
Buyoya initiated the “national unity” policy, which was about the sharing of 
power with ethnic Hutu members, who had become practically excluded 
since the 1972 crisis, from 20% government share to half.61 In 1991, anew 
commission in charge of the return, reinsertion of refugees (Commission 
Nationale chargée du retour, de l’accueil et de l’insertion des réfugiés Bu-
rundais) was established in 1991, with a double mission: help repatriates 
settle in available properties and investigate the cause of disputes during 
relocation of refugees, and strengthen national unity reconciliation.62 This 
was contentious because it clearly stated that repatriates were not to seek 
57 David Newbury and Newbury Catherine “Bringing the Peasants Back In: Agrarian Themes 
in the Construction and Corrosion of Statist Historiography in Rwanda” in The American 
Historical Review, Vol. 105, No. 3 (Jun., 2000), pp. 832-877; Kohlhagen, “In quest of legitimacy.”
58 Kohlhagen, “In quest of legitimacy.”
59 Article 231 of the 1986 Land Code in Kohlhagen, “In quest of legitimacy” 2.
60 Gatunange, “La problématique foncière,” 13.
61 RCN Justice and Democracy, Etude sur les pratiques foncières au Burundi,” 12.
62 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, (28 August 2000, Arusha) 18; RCN 
Justice and Democracy, Etude sur les pratiques foncières au Burundi,” 12.
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to gain their properties if they were occupied by others, as they would be 
given land elsewhere. The government sought to settle them elsewhere 
rather than the region they had come from.63 All the persons who could not 
return to their properties was given two hectares on vacant land, villages 
were also prepared.64
After almost three decades of military republican rule, democratic 
elections took place in June 1993, Melchior Ndadaye, the Hutu leader of 
the pro-Hutu Frodebu (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi) was elected 
in June 1993. The victory of Frodebu in 1993 resulted in the massive return 
of refugees occurred, and resulted in the returnees seeking their land.
Created in the political context of agitation, the commission was re-
actived after the victory of FRODEBU. Under attack was the clause, which 
prevented the refugees from gaining their old properties. Occupants were 
thrown out. Ndadaye made a speech in Makamba, where he called for the 
respect of vested rights unless the occupant owned several properties, the 
state would allocate land for the returning refugees.65 Yet, after Ndadaye 
is killed in 1993, former refugees fled Burundi once more, and many Tutsi 
were internally displaced.66 This plunged Burundi into a civil war, which 
brought back President Buyoya in power from 1996 to 2003.
The law continuously privileged those who remained behind, hence 
it is the “instrumental use of law” which the government has never ques-
tioned and which is at the root of multiple land disputes.67 “The core prob-
lem is that most of the spoliations and land grabs were at some point le-
galised, giving corruption and clientelism an almost normative character. 
To a large extent, statutory law in Burundi facilitates and even encourages 
practices that most people perceive as arbitrary, inequitable and unjust,” 
writes Kohlhagen.68 Politicized ethnicities and violence by the state, pro-
duced a land where ethnicity and indigeneity become tied. When people 
flee violence, even though their land may change ‘ownership’, the refugees 
are remembered as the ‘first’ owners.
63 Gatunange, “La problématique foncière,” 12.
64 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, (28 August 2000, Arusha) 19.
65 RCN Justice and Democracy, Etude sur les pratiques foncières au Burundi,” 14.
66 RCN Justice and Democracy, Etude sur les pratiques foncières au Burundi,” 20.
67 Kohlhagen, “In quest of legitimacy.”
68 Kohlhagen, “In quest of legitimacy,” 4.
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TRC and consociational power-sharing
Parliament approved the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission in April 2014, at the same time that the special court for the CNTB 
was approved. The TRC will study ethnic violence from 1962 till 2008 for 
a period of four years, in order to identify which crimes were committed 
and who were its perpetrators. It will not have the right to prosecute. There 
have been no other avenues to discuss the past, or judge culprits of mass 
violence, be it the state, the individuals, groups or rebel groups.
The delay in creating a truth and reconciliation commission is due 
the form of political settlement, which Burundi underwent to end the 
civil war, a product of the Arusha agreement brokered by South Africa, 
Tanzania, and signed by the main opposition Hutu and Tutsi parties and 
the president in 2003. Although the CNDD-FDD did not sign this agreement, 
its emergence into power, through the parliamentary vote, was brokered 
by the Arusha agreement. The agreement has sculpted the current con-
stitutional and political landscape.69 This political settlement was based 
on “consociational power-sharing arrangement between ethnopolitical 
groups and an elite bargain between politicomilitary leaders”.70 Burundi’s 
government follows a consociational power-sharing model, which requires 
it by the constitution to have a maximum of 60% Hutu ministers and a max-
imum of 40% Tutsi ministers. At least 30% are women. Thus the National 
Assembly had to have 60% Hutu, and 40% Tutsi and a minimum of 30% 
women representatives. The Minister of National Defence and the Minis-
ter in charge of the National Police must belong to different ethnic group.71 
Each political party must have a mixture of Hutu and Tutsi candidates on 
the electoral lists. Each party has to have ethnic and gender diversity, thus 
“the dominant party CNDD-FDD, while rooted in a Hutu rebel movement, 
is no longer perceived as an exclusive Hutu party. Despite defusing ethnic 
tension, the Arusha Agreement was an elite power-sharing pact, focussing 
on the sharing of senior political, military or economic positions.72 Thus 
due to the character of Burundi’s transition, the TRC was delayed due to the 
ethnopolitical and politicomilitary groups not in the least being interested 
in transition justice: “As many of them have blood-stained hands, their in-
69 Vandeginste, S. “Burundi’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: How to Shed Light on the 
Past while Standing in the Dark Shadow of Politics?” in The International Journal of Transitional 
Justice, 2012, 1–11; Vandeginste S. “Power-sharing, Conflict and Transition in Burundi: Twenty 
Years of Trial and Error” Africa Spectrum, 44, 3, 63-86 (2009).
70 Vandeginste, “Burundi’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” 5.
71 Vandeginste, “Power-sharing,” 75.
72 Vandeginste, “Burundi’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission”.
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terests converge in having as little truth and accountability as possible.” For 
example if the CNDD-FDD is in power and handles the TRC process, other 
parties will be concerned with “one-sided truth telling”.73
The power-sharing model has not led to a success in other state-build-
ing goals of democracy such as the rule of law, accountability, effective 
governance, anti-corruption or avoiding the electoral authoritarianism.74 
Consocialitonalism has not prevented the ruling party from becoming 
increasingly authoritarian, despite being perceived as providing a stable 
power-sharing democracy ending political violence and electoral authori-
tarianism. It has been argued that the last 2010 elections resulted in a more 
authoritarian state with the re-lone election of President Pierre Nkurun-
ziza and the boycott by major opposition parties. However, opposition 
parties, that include former foes, formed a coalition to fight the growing 
hegemony of the ruling party. This has showcased a maturity among op-
position parties. The 2015 elections has increased the hold of the ruling 
party, as President Nkurunziza chose to run for a third mandate on 21 July 
and won the elections, despite the constitution, based on the Arusha agree-
ment, recognizing a two-term limits. The constitution in the end approved 
President Nkurunziza’s candidacy as its independence was questioned 
and doubted. This has led to protests similar to the ones earlier in Makam-
ba province over land disputes, as neighbourhoods in the city of Bujum-
bura, have led anti-third mandate protests. They have since have been the 
targets of killings allegedly led by the police and youth members of the 
ruling party Imbonerakure, as well as opposition party members and civil 
society. This has tarnished President Nkurunziza’s third term as it has also 
been accused of seeking to reignite ethnic antagonism. This caused once 
more the movement of the population with an estimated 175,000 refugees 
in neighbouring countries.75
Land commission: a reconciliatory policy
The 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi estab-
lished a commission to assist refugees and displaced persons in recovering 
their properties.76 Emphasis is placed on the right to regain possession of 
73 Vandeginste, “Burundi’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” 5.
74 Vandeginste, “Power-sharing”.
75 European Commission, “EU increases humanitarian aid for Burundi refugees,” press release, 
Brussels, July 30 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5453_en.htm.
76 Article 2 (e) of chapter one on “Rehabilitation and Resettlement of refugees and sinistrés” in 
Protocol IV Reconstruction and Development, Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 
for Burundi, (28 August 2000, Arusha), 77.
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one’s land in conformity to the laws and regulations of Burundi for the two 
identified groups of refugees and the sinistrés who are “all displaced, re-
grouped and dispersed persons and returnees”.77 When they cannot recov-
er their property, they should be compensated, the Arusha agreement said.
The Commission Nationale de Réhabilitation des Sinistrés (CNRS) created 
in 2002 as a product of the Arusha agreement, was in 2006 replaced by the 
Commission Nationale Terres et autres Biens (CNTB).. The government issued 
a call for the return of refugees in 2002, but it was in 2008 that saw a high 
number of repatriates return following the tripartite action of The Burundi 
government the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and the 
Tanzanian government.78
The CNTB classifies refugees in two categories: longstanding refugees 
from 1972, and the second category is made up of recent refugees who fled 
the country in 1993 (including a large number of internally displaced popu-
lation): this includes both members of Hutu and Tutsi population. The 1993 
refugees were able to more or less regain easily their property. The main 
problem was the long-standing refugees of over 30 years who returned and 
wished to access their former properties. People without reference to their 
former property were placed in ‘integrated rural villages’, which included 
refugees of 1972. The number of 1972 and 1993 refugees repatriated from 
2002 to 2009: 524,222 with the majority being 1993 refugees79 while 162,156 
Burundi refugees received citizenship from Tanzania in 2014.
In the CNTB report 2006-2011, the land commission sets out to resolve 
conflicts connected to the 1972 crisis through the “amicable settlement, 
restitution of property, sharing of property, demarcation, transfer, retro-
cession, confirmation of ownership by occupier, compensation.” The two 
groups concerned are the refugees back from exile who wonder about ac-
cessing their old properties and those who have lived in those properties 
for over thirty years and who are concerned about what would happened 
if they lost the land.80 In all its activities the CNTB aims to be neutral and to 
“reconcile law, equity, peaceful cohabitation and peace consolidation.” The 
role of the commission was to explain and make the repatriate and the res-
ident, understand that neither of them were at the root cause of the conflict 
77 Ibid.
78 République du Burundi, 2006 – 2011, 27.
79 Dissertation by Jean-Baptiste Ndayiragije entitled “Non-institutional mechanisms to resolve 
land conflicts between residents and returnees: Study of Nyanza-Lac commune in Makamba 
Province”, April 2011
80 République du Burundi, 2006 – 2011, 2.
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and that they will gain from such cohabitation.”81 The land commission has 
a provincial delegation in each province, whose work is to do an inventory 
of land owned by the state, and identify land illegally acquired, handle all 
cases submitted by the sinistrés, who are all the displaced, regrouped and 
dispersed persons and returnees, with the aim of helping them recover 
their property, provide technical assistance to sinistrés to acquire their prop-
erty rights.82 The land commission considered the possibility of compen-
sating the sinistrés who have not recovered their land or goods and resolve 
pending litigations from the previous commissions, but this has not been 
done in practice.
 The repatriate, upon his return from exile – from the war – and finds 
his plot occupied by another person or the state has built some form of 
infrastructure is to seek the CNTB. The report emphasizes that those who 
seek the CNTB is limited to those who fled because of the “socio-political 
crises”.83 Often the repatriate has to use witnesses as they hold no land 
title while the occupant has one. Thus it is a battle whether memory and 
customary right or the law will win. With customary land, memory can 
help produce evidence, in locating the land, neighbours or people who can 
attest one’s ownership. Law means that the occupant must produce a land 
title. Yet the burden remains on the claimants to bring evidence that they 
were previous owners of the properties as a land title, which is not often 
there, is not required but witnesses rather.
The difficulties faced by refugees upon return or an internally dis-
placed person include: the property was shared among remaining family 
members, the state took ownership of it and distributed it, or the land was 
requisitioned by the state for infrastructural projects.84 The CNTB then asks 
the person to bring documents or witnesses and record the “plaintiff”, the 
“accused” living in the plot is invited to bring documents/explain them-
selves, bring a witness to support him, next part is when the land commis-
sion tried to make them reach a compromise. When the two parties fail 
to reach an agreement, CNTB settles it by: restitution of the property when 
the property was annexed, or the owner dispossessed, and when the land 
was exploited by the occupant, the commission will give the occupant one 
quarter of the land and three quarters to the repatriate. If the occupant 
has documents, proof that they are occupying the land legally, then the 
81 République du Burundi, Commission Nationale Terres et autres Biens: son organisation et ses 
activités 2006 – 2010, (Lake House, Bujumbura), 19.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 République du Burundi, 2006 – 2011, 2.
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property can be cut in half, but not always, depending on its proportion. If a 
claimants’ land was taken over by public infrastructures then the state has 
give the claimant land with the same surface area. Through retrocession if 
land was occupied illegally, or compensation when the occupant returns 
property, his assets should be evaluated and receive a compensation for 
them, but the commission has no funding for it.85
The from 2006 to 2011 in its first mandate led by the clergyman 
Astère Kana, primarily sought to do inventory of land owned by the state, 
vacant land and privileged the sharing of properties or mediated settle-
ment agreed by both parties. By 2011, over 27,000 cases were registered with 
the CNTB, close to 66% were amicably resolved, while 20% were settled by 
CNTB.86 Before the CNTB’s existence, the mode of resolving land disputes 
was the involvement of local leaders such as Bashingantahe.87 In the past, 
Bashingantahe as wise men and women of the community, alongside local 
leaders, use to resolve disputes in the community. They have now become 
excluded from this process. Yet customary law remains important with the 
institution of Bashingantahe: “Negotiation, conciliation and arbitration con-
tinue to play an important role, whereas only very few people recognise 
written state law as an effective means to mitigate conflicts. Not only the 
Bashingantahe but also state administrators and even judges in state courts 
refer to customary values and logics to settle disputes”.88
The land disputes in Nyanza-Lac peasantries in the Makamba prov-
ince are explained by the CNTB as due to the 1972 crisis whereby, large 
parts of the population fled, an area previously very populated and rich 
in agriculture.89 In 1976, the government urged the population to return, 
some return others did not, those who returned did not return to settle 
but rather to reap, and would return to Tanzania and neighbouring DRC. 
In view of this “abandonment”, writes the report, the government decided 
upon new usage of the land, it cleared the now forested land, and settled 
new peasantries, as part of this new agricultural project, the government 
would dictate what to plant, agronomists would monitor the planting of 
food crops: palm trees and cotton. The repatriates upon their return would 
expect to recover their plot but found other people settled in those parts 
85 République du Burundi, 2006 – 2010, 26.
86 République du Burundi, 2006 – 2011, 43.
87 These are trusted “wise men,” chosen by the community as their mediators and 
representatives, from pre-colonial era. To solve land conflicts between returnees, residents, 
solution reached with the Bashingantahe was to share the property.
88 Kohlhagen, “In quest of legitimacy,” 9.
89 République du Burundi, 2006 – 2010, 27.
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by the government. This set out the beginning of the land conflicts in the 
peasantries.90
The CNTB policy considers everybody as a survivor, it encourages rec-
onciliation and prioritizes land sharing or agreement reached between 
both parties. Such an approach privileges the present, peaceful living and 
the breaking down of victim-perpetrator narrative.
Praxis of land restitution
Prudence Bigirimana in southern Burundi in Bururi province, a Tutsi, and 
native of another commune Matana, in the hinterland of the province, has 
been living in Rumonge, a town on the coast of lake Tanganyika, for over 
two decades. Bigirimana lost his plot of land to a repatriate last year in 2014 
in the Rumonge commune. The returnee Nyabenda Buyabara returned 
from Tanzania in 2009 and sought to resolve the problem amicably. Failing 
to reach an understanding, Buyabara then went to the land commission to 
claim his property. Bigirimana on the other hand, argued, showing proof, 
that it is the OHP (Palm oil office)91, a state company, which gave out the 
land to encourage farmers to plant oil palms in 1983. In 2013, the land com-
mission listened to both parties and visited the property. The commission 
thereafter gave right of property to Bigirimana, and then asked the plaintiff 
to make an appeal at the national level within two months deadline. The 
appeal did not take place. Nevertheless in May 2014, Bigirimana attested 
that the commission brought the repatriate in the property by force and re-
fused to listen to Bigirimana. Bigirimana questioned how the commission 
could give out land to someone who lost before the same commission and 
did not even appeal. This Bigirimana said, is a regular occurrence with the 
CNTB, and would eventually lead to conflict, as two conflicting decisions 
were made in one case. The commission defended itself saying that Buy-
abara complained to the commission after Bigirimana sold the property to 
someone else92. Bigirimana owns another home where he resides in Ru-
monge.
In an interview with Bigirimana,93 he called the commission “fraud-
ulent”, describing it as corrupt with the commission in his view urging 
repatriates to seek a number of people to play the role of witnesses to claim 
land, which is not theirs, by paying CNTB some money. There is a lot of 
90 République du Burundi, 2006 – 2010, 28.
91 This was previously the SRD Rumonge (Société Régionale de Développement)
92 Interview with Prudence Bigirimana, December 2014.
93 Dieudonné Hakizimana “Bururi, Makamba: La CNTB accusée de partialité,” Iwacu, May 26, 
2014, http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/bururi-makamba-la-cntb-accusee-de-partialite.
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hostility in the community, said Bigirimana, adding, “now we are hoping 
for a change in government: we hope a new body will come to undo the 
injustice done.” For Bigirimana, it is less about ethnicity now, ethnicity only 
appears when it comes to revisiting cases already settled by the sharing of 
property between returnees and residents, and when houses built post-
1972 are attributed to repatriates or claimants because they were built in 
those same properties by the residing property owner.
Pierre Bandyatuyaga, who lost two of his properties in 1972 in Ru-
monge, gained them both in April 2014. Bandyatuyaga was elated and said 
justice was served, “better late than never”. He won the case after appeal 
in the special court. Emmanuella Tuyishemeza a representative of one of 
occupants of the properties said that the commission granted Bandyatuy-
aga the home without considering that it is her father who built the house 
in the property and not Bandyatuyaga. Tuyishemeza added that previously, 
the appeal court had rejected the CNTB provincial delegation’s decision to 
attribute the property to Bandyatuyaga, and suggested that the property be 
divided into two.94
The CNTB came under the presidency’s office following revision of 
the CNTB law in 2011, and welcomed newcomer members of the ruling par-
ty, and the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL) members who actively 
took part in the armed rebellion – which ended in 2006 – were appointed 
as provincial delegates of the CNTB. The new CNTB head in 2011, Serapion 
Bambonanire, accused the work of CNTB of favouring the residents and also 
called for unconditional restitution of land for the 1972 refugees from resi-
dents who were now referred to as secondary occupants.95 The commission 
after 2011 sought for those living in the property owned previously by the 
Hutu who fled 1972, to promptly vacate the property. In the land commis-
sion’s records, up to 2013, out of 37,062 cases recorded since 2006, 59,9% 
were resolved amicably, 26,12% resolved through CNTB decision – which 
means, the current occupant told to vacate the property, 13,98% not conflict 
related cases, cases which are unresolved 29,88%96. Another change in the 
land commission’s mission was article four of the mission, composition, or-
ganization and functioning of the commission, concede a change that from 
2011 onwards, that if parties fail to reach an agreement at the provincial 
94 Nzorubonanya Felix “Rumonge: La CNTB restitute deux maisons à un rapatrié sur fond de 
contestations,” Iwacu, April 4, 2014, http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/rumonge-la-cntb-restitue-
deux-maisons-a-un-rapatrie-sur-fond-de-contestations/
95 The sacking of Bambonanire was sacked as the head of the CNTB on 18 April 2015, is related to 
the Makamba incident Bambonanire
96 Statistics received from CNTB, 2013.
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delegation level, the injured party can appeal to the national commission 
within two months of the decision made.97
The spokesperson of the president, Léonidas Hatungimana, has ar-
gued that the state cannot be blamed in the past when it allocated land to 
new occupants after 1972, but rather the blame is on the occupants of that 
land, who became ‘illegal occupants’, because “the state had washed off its 
hands with the laws.”98 This is in reference to presidential decrees in 1974 
and 1977, which withdrew the seizure of properties of people condemned 
in May 1972, with the law decree of 1977 allowing the lawful reintegration of 
people who fled events of 1972. The land commission is reconciliatory be-
cause “when someone demands the jacket of his murdered father, without 
demanding their death, this is more than conciliatory?” asked Hatungima-
na. Thus for the president’s spokesperson, the illegal occupant should 
voluntarily return what does not belong to him, with compensations from 
benefiting from the “illegal occupation”. For Hatungimana there are no 
laws, which refer to compensation of illegally, enjoyed properties but in-
stead there are laws regarding compensating a claimant whose property 
they can no longer access. Thus the notion of a legal occupant of a property 
with a land title was refuted, or a secondary occupant or who bought the 
land in good faith. This dismissal absolved the state, even though the state 
sold many properties, or encouraged population to move into vacant land.99
In an exchange workshop in July 2013, to evaluate the work of CNTB 
and organized by the office of the presidency, creating a compensation 
fund was rejected because the CNTB does not believe that there are those 
who bought property in good faith.100 Pierre Claver Sinzinkayo, head of 
the CNTB’s provincial delegation in the city of Bujumbura, said that they 
could not recognize title deeds by such occupants because that there are no 
good faith occupants, because the government that issued title deeds was 
in their view illegitimate because it had condemned to death the property 
owners, before seizing their property. Therefore no title deeds can be legal-
ly recognizable. Sinzinkayo emphasised that the CNTB was not put in place 
to dispossess one population for the benefit of another, but rather to “rec-
tify errors of the past and rehabilitate victims of injustice committed in the 
97 République du Burundi, 2006 – 2011, 11
98 Edouard Madirisha, “Karusi: Léonidas Hatungimana la star de la CNTB,” Iwacu, June 22, 2013 
(http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/karusi-leonidas-hatungimana-la-star-de-la-cntb.
99 République du Burundi, 2006 – 2011, 53.
100 Floribert Nisabwe et Philippe Ngendakumana, “CNTB: que veut dire « acquéreur de bonne 
foi?”, Iwacu, July 3, 2013, http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/cntb-que-veut-dire-acquereur-de-
bonne-foi/
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past.”101 Sinzinkayo questioned the authenticity of documents proving own-
ership of properties because the owners had been condemned to death.
Pauline Ntacunkurikira, whose husband was killed in 1972, was giv-
en her property by the land commission, after forcing out of the plot, 116 
family members, in Busoni, in northern province of Kirundi in July 2014.102 
The residents were told to vacate the 5 hectares plot.  They argued that 
they had bought the land in 1980 from money they had received as com-
pensation for the land they were forced by the state to relocate in order to 
make place for a market. The evicted, added that they knew nothing about 
the previous ownership and history of this property. They furthermore said 
that they did not know that the first property owner was a menja, a nega-
tive connotation used in the official literature to refer to a Hutu rebel. This 
term is prevalent in the discussion of Hutus, who have been portrayed as 
rebels, bamenja, and not as the victims of 1972. Thus the Hutu who fled 
1972, were portrayed as rebels who attacked the people and the state, yet 
rebels though they had some support in the communes they launched the 
attack were not representative of the whole Hutu population. What is not 
discussed is the oppression thereafter.
In an interview with a CNTB official in November 2013, working on cas-
es in Bujumbura city, he estimated that 85% of land disputes cases are Hutu 
vs. Hutu over plot disputes, thus for him, ethnicity only plays an aspect in 
the restitution of houses not land. Yet when it comes to housing it is disput-
ed between Tutsi vs. Hutu. The disputes over property, which the official 
was handling in Bujumbura, were about Tutsi residing in houses owned 
previously by Hutu. Property is returned to 1972 owners, while the current 
owner is not compensated but told to pursue the person they brought the 
house from, the official added. The CNTB is viewed as a politicized entity, in 
place to settle political and ethnic score, according to Abbot Adrien Ntabo-
na, the former head of the Bashingantahe council. For Ntabona, the current 
ruling party wishes to gain a Hutu electorate through this. Describing it 
as an ‘explosive situation,’ he said that no mushingantahe can get involved 
because there is a lot of scheming within the land commission. The inter-
viewed CNTB official said those who oppose its work have politicized it, and 
yet those who oppose CNTB argue that it is the CNTB, which has politicized 
land restitution. For the CNTB official, land disputes are instrumentalized 
101 Dieudonné Hakizimana, “CNTB: “Pas acquéreur de bonne foi,” Iwacu, August 7, 2013, http://
www.iwacu-burundi.org/cntb-pas-dacquereur-de-bonne-foi.
102 Philippe Ngendakumana, “Les déguerpis de la CNTB, à Busoni: une décision légale mais 
injuste,” Iwacu, July 28, 2014, http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/les-deguerpis-de-la-cntb-a-
busoni-une-decision-legale-mais-injuste.
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and are “an opportunity to express the frustrations against the CNDD [-FDD, 
the ruling party].”103 Political parties and civil society argue that the CNTB 
has not aimed at reconciliation, but is instead reviving ethnic hatred accus-
ing the ruling party of seeking votes in the 2015 elections.104
The land commission is used by the state to depoliticize the land 
disputes, by bureaucratizing the process of land, making it a procedural 
matter. Yet increasingly, the land commission’s work is seen as reigniting 
not only ethnic tension but as privileging one part of the population over 
the other, in its endeavour to remediate the past. The land commission 
on the other hand argues that reconciliation can only happen when those 
who have returned have their property restored. This has limited the com-
mission’s capacity to listen to both sides, and has aggravated disputes over 
land. The CNTB policy in praxis has privileged the past, rendering justice 
to the victims of 1972, by ensuring that beneficiaries of the past, vacate the 
properties belonging to the refugees. The beneficiaries are viewed as the 
perpetrators, illegal occupants who knowingly stayed in properties that did 
not belong to them despite those with land titles. The state is absolved of 
any responsibility, despite contradicting laws in previous commissions.
Ending remarks
As sovereignty shifted from body to territory during the colonial period, 
indigeneity that indicated those who first cleared the land was replaced by 
ethnicity to mark bodies. Politics and ethnicity as products of continued 
racialized centralized despotism in the post-independence state produced 
law to suit itself, and violence - connecting and disconnecting the body to 
territory, bringing out a new form of ethnicized indigeneity in the twenti-
eth century, marking the ‘ethnic’ body as tied to particular property.
Land restitution in Burundi shows how a new policy may emerge as 
the outcome of the land commission’s actions, and inactions. This process 
is complicated with properties passing through many owners, and the state 
passing laws, which allowed occupants to gain ownership of the proper-
ty with time, legalizing the dispossession of population who fled for their 
lives. The establishment of the land commission without a Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission to work hand-in-hand together to acknowledge 
events of the past, and provide funding for compensation, has created 
and continues to create new victims and perpetrators, and performed in-
103 Interview with a CNTB official in November 2013.
104 Rénovat Ndabashinze, “Forsc: la loi sur la CNTB souffle sur les braises de la haine ethnique en 
faisant les yeux doux aux Hutu,” Iwacu, January 1, 2014, http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/forsc-
loi-cntb-souffle-sur-les-braises-de-la-haine-ethnique-en-faveur-hutu-contre-tutsi.
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clusionary and exclusionary practices that have strained the nation and 
peace building process of Burundi post-violence. The political settlement, 
based on consociational power-sharing agreement, has been a top-down 
initiative and has not engaged in dialogue with the population, rather di-
viding the population as either perpetrator or victim. Not compensating 
the residents and holding them accountable for past violence by the state 
against the population. Land restitution in this instance comes to inform 
and strengthen one view of the past where one part of the population is a 
victim of another part of the population. This also shows how malleable 
the law is, it has been used to dispossess a population fleeing violence and 
to also give them back their land.
Can the state’s approach plausibly be considered as restorative justice 
and as transcending the categories of conflict? Does this serve as founda-
tion for a new society: a new community, new political relation, and new 
man/woman in post conflict Burundi? Unfortunately the responses to these 
interrelated questions are negative. Despite invoking land as restorative 
justice, the Burundi experiment has been seen as having many challenges. 
The approach is elitist and too institutional and fails to involve communi-
ties in addressing land alienation and other legacies of the violence. At the 
top, the two, commission and the special court are passing conflictual or-
ders and decisions, which have been challenged, by other court. It appears 
more of a corrective rather than restorative justice.
In brief, the Burundi experience reveals the scar and trauma of the 
violence in the political foundation and essence of the post conflict com-
munity of Burundi. Mamdani105 argues that the solution is the deethnici-
zation and depoliticization of ethnic identities, through survivor’s justice, 
in which Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa are both survivors and all belong to the land. 
Land ownership and reform has become central to political reform and 
political justice in Burundi, defining who are the victims, perpetrators not 
survivors is what the government has done.
105 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers.
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